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Introduction 
Religion is undergoing a transformation in current Western so-
ciety. In addition to organized religions, there is a notable 
movement towards spirituality that is not associated with any 
institutions. Viewed broadly, religion and spirituality may be 
defined as the experience of or reference to the absolute or the 
unconditional in different cultural areas, such as philosophy, 
theology, art, and politics. Religion and spirituality encompass 
a specific relationship between heaven and earth, between 
‚here‛ and ‚beyond.‛ Temporal metaphors may also be used to 
describe these terms: the present as opposed to a mythical, 
primal past or the present contrasting with the future as a time 
of salvation. In their art, abstract expressionists such as Pollock, 
Newman, and Rothko sought a spiritual solution to the 
spiritual crisis in the US in the 1940s and 1950s, incorporating 
the old myths with their references to a legendary past. 
Judaism, Christianity and Marxism are characterized by a Mes-
sianic desire, in which transcendence was regarded primarily a 
matter of the future.  
Transcendence can be described as God, the absolute, Mys-
tery, the Other, the other as other or as alterity, depending on 
one’s worldview. But how can one indicate shifts in the views 
of transcendence and the transcendent in different areas of 
culture such as philosophy, theology, art, and politics? A four-
fold, heuristic model will be proposed for purposes of carrying 
out this research. 
Since the Romantic period, four different types of 
transcendence can be identified in Western culture. These are 
basic forms that have been given content in different ways by 
writers or artists on the basis of their worldview or artistic 
background. This model of four types will be used as a search 
instrument to point to the different ways of relating ‚here‛ and 
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‚beyond,‛ ‚present‛ and ‚primal past‛/‛future‛ in the different 
areas of culture. It will become apparent from the discussion of 
the typology whether or not this heuristic model should be fine-
tuned or supplemented. 
A short description of the four types of transcendence is 
followed by a discussion of the importance of the term ‚trans-
cendence‛ as an indicator of the religious or spiritual dimension 
in contemporary culture. Examples, drawn from the work of 
prominent writers, illustrate the ways in which the types or 
forms of transcendence receive certain content. It becomes clear 
that two types have developed out of the Christian religion, the 
religion that has traditionally stamped Western culture. The 
other two are situated more or less on the margins of or outside 
organized religion or have given a humanist-spiritual content to 
transcendence. 
Four Types of Transcendence 
According to the first view, God (or the absolute) and the hu-
man being are directly connected. Despite their alienation from 
the absolute, people have an immediate awareness of that abso-
lute. In conquering this alienation, the human being discovers 
something that is identical to him- or herself, even though it 
transcends that person infinitely. It is something from which 
the human being is alienated, but from which he/she can never 
be separated. This relationship between God and human beings 
may be called ‚immanent transcendence‛: both realities are 
viewed as being closely involved with each other—the absolute 
is experienced in and through mundane reality. Variants of this 
type can be found in, for example, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and 
Tillich. 
The other view sees the relationship of the human being 
with God as a relationship with something that is unknown. In 
contrast to the first view, here God and human beings are seen 
as radically different. Any encounter of the human being with 
God is an encounter with a stranger. Theologically, the first 
type lays the emphasis more on human openness to a revelation 
from God, whereas the second type takes the movement of God 
or the absolute towards the human being as its starting point. 
This relationship between God and the human being may be 
called ‚radical transcendence‛: the absolute is the wholly other 
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and thus sharply distinguished from mundane reality. Variants 
of this type can be found in Kierkegaard, Barth, and Marion. 
What has been described as two types of transcendence 
can be identified in philosophy as metaphysical identity think-
ing (there is an identity between logos and reality, between 
thinking and being) and the critique of metaphysical identity 
thinking in difference thinking. In the latter, being does not co-
incide with beings; neither does being coincide with thinking 
(as expounded by Heidegger and his followers).  
Transcendence is shifting in contemporary culture. H. 
Kunneman (2005) speaks of a shift from ‚vertical‛ to ‚horizon-
tal transcendence.‛ The latter often has to do with ethical values 
in which respect for the other is central. This can be found in 
Irigaray and Luc Ferry. Kunneman sees the shift from vertical 
to horizontal transcendence in contemporary theology as well. 
Instead of vertical transcendence with its authoritarian concept 
of God, ‚the name of God [is] connected with caring, morally 
involved, loving relationships both between people mutually 
and on the level of person‛ (Kunneman 2005: 67). The distinc-
tion between vertical and horizontal transcendence can also in-
dicate the opposition between this world and another world 
outside this one. One could think here of vertical transcendence 
such as Plato described it in the allegory of the cave—the way 
of liberation is upward, away from the shadows of the cave to 
the light of truth and ideas (Plato 1956: 514a-520a)—or the 
vision Augustine had in the harbour of Ostia in which he also 
ascended to God (Augustine 1983: IX.10). In modern times, 
some 18th-century deists viewed transcendence as isolated: 
God is viewed as a retired engineer who no longer has any con-
nection with the world. 
Describing the shift in the view of transcendence as being 
from vertical to horizontal might be regarded as too general. 
Moreover, this does not do any justice to the two types of trans-
cendence mentioned. Each would then be viewed as vertical, 
which would be incorrect because immanent transcendence 
bridges the opposition between horizontal and vertical in that 
both elements are in balance with each other. Radical trans-
cendence has just as little to do with transcendence if the latter 
refers to something that is purely outside this world. Trans-
cendence is conceived precisely as either involvement with hu-
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mankind and the world (Judaism and Islam) or in relation with 
the incarnation (Christianity). In the light of the shift regarding 
the view of transcendence, it is appropriate to point to at least 
two types of transcendence. 
That ‚here‛ and ‚beyond‛ can be so closely associated that 
the one pole, that of transcendence, becomes neutralized and 
only immanence seems to be left. This third type may be re-
ferred to as ‚radical immanence‛: the absolute is no longer 
sought outside mundane reality; both realities converge, with 
the absolute emptying itself in mundane reality (kenosis). 
Prominent proponents of radical immanence include the ‚God 
is dead‛ theologians such as Thomas Altizer and Mark Taylor 
(during a particular phase), following Hegel and Nietzsche. The 
philosopher Vattimo also falls into this group, especially in his 
reflections on Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
The fourth type builds on radical transcendence, but em-
phasizes the inexpressibility of the Other in a different way. It is 
distinguished from radical transcendence in that it rejects the 
opposition between transcendence and immanence. This type 
may be referred to as ‚transcendence as alterity.‛ The 
relationship between transcendence and immanence is no 
longer viewed as an opposition. Rather, one has learned to 
think beyond the opposition, whereby the wholly other can 
appear in every other. This type can be found in Levinas, 
Derrida, Irigaray, De Dijn and Taylor (during a specific period). 
This type has an open character and can be given religious or 
non-religious content.1 There are, of course, instances that lie on 
                                                 
1 In a somewhat different way, transcendence as alterity can also 
be found in the works of the Dutch philosopher, Otto Duintjer. In his 
view, traditional metaphysics does not do enough justice to alterity 
insofar as it grounds beings in a supreme being. Duintjer resumes the 
transcendental question of metaphysics by querying the conditions for 
the possibility of normative frameworks or practices in which life is 
lived. He formulates spiritual transcendence in a post-metaphysical 
way as the Inexhaustible, as an all-encompassing dimension that no 
longer functions as a world above ours, a first cause or foundation. 
Rather, it is an unlimited space that can appear in many articulations 
(Duintjer 1988, 2002; Stoker 1990; Visser 2002).  
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the boundary between radical transcendence and 
transcendence as alterity. For example, could Barth and Marion 
be classified more adequately under the latter category than 
under the former?  
The Importance of the Types 
It is important to distinguish each of the four fundamental 
types of transcendence for at least two reasons. First of all, 
views of transcendence are normative in character and de-
termine one’s orientation in life. A few examples of this are 
outlined below. 
The life of faith Dostoyevsky sketches in The Idiot is 
informed by immanent transcendence. Prince Myshkin does not 
live with a distant God; rather, for him, the transcendent God is 
immanent in the world, lovingly present in the form of Jesus 
Christ whose goodness Myshkin himself radiates. In his novel 
Knielen op een bed violen (Kneeling on a bed of violins), the Dutch 
writer Jan Siebelink narrates a life of faith that is dominated by 
a radically transcendent God. In an impressive way, he sketches 
Hans Sievez’s life of faith, describing a man who lives with a 
radically transcendent God and is thus at loggerheads with his 
family and work. Philosopher and literary theorist George 
Steiner argues that there is a crisis in philosophy, art, and 
literature because the contract between word and world has 
been broken. This crisis is said to have resulted from the loss of 
transcendence in contemporary culture. He himself argues for a 
reinstatement of transcendence (Stoker 2008a). Islam’s view of 
radical transcendence determines its view of art. Because 
figurative representations are forbidden in Islamic religious art, 
other elements, such as characters, ornaments, and arabesques, 
become important. The political philosopher Eric Voegelin 
shows how totalitarian ideology in politics can be seen as an 
immanent substitute for religious symbols oriented to 
transcendence (Buijs 1998). 
Second, distinguishing each of the four basic forms of 
transcendence is also important because certain forms of trans-
cendence have a critical function with respect to culture. Those 
who advocate radical transcendence or transcendence as alter-
ity are usually critical of culture, whereas those who work with 
immanent transcendence look for a mediation between religion 
6                                                     LOOKING BEYOND? 
and culture. Those who advocate radical immanence will be 
less critical of culture, as may be seen below in Altizer. 
There are studies that deal with transcendence in the fields 
of philosophy, theology, and literature (Schwartz 2004) or poli-
tics (Sanders 2005) or art (De la Motte-Haber 2003, Schmied and 
Schilling 1990). With the exception of Taylor (1992)—whose 
analysis has been used critically for the model proposed 
above—the concept of transcendence is usually left unspecified. 
The philosophical study Transcendence and Beyond (Caputo and 
Scanlon 2007) also takes account of shifting transcendence in 
postmodern philosophy. If the concept of transcendence is dif-
ferentiated, then differences and overlapping with respect to 
shifts in the area of religion and spirituality in the different cul-
tural areas can be more easily detected. 
Types of Transcendence as Form or Open Concept 
Is it not lacking in nuance simply to include various, quite 
different philosophers, theologians, and artists under one type 
of transcendence? Barth and Marion, both of whom advocate 
radical transcendence, differ quite widely in their ideas, as do 
Altizer and Vattimo, who both argue for radical immanence. In 
art, there are differences between artists like Caspar David 
Friedrich and Anselm Kiefer, but the works of both exemplify 
immanent transcendence. In order to do justice to the unique 
aspects of a work of a thinker or an artist, the types should be 
viewed as ‚forms‛ or ‚open concepts.‛ They are given further 
‚content‛ or ‚specification‛ by researching the author or artist 
more closely.  
An example of this may be seen in Friederich’s Two Men 
Contemplating the Moon (1819)—two men are standing on a 
moonlit slope watching the moon. For Friedrich, nature pro-
claimed the glory of God’s creation. For Kiefer, immanent 
transcendence is present in a different way. The landscape is 
not idyllic but wounded by the violence of war, as his work 
Winter Landscape (1970) shows. In this work, a severed head 
floats between a sinister heaven and a winter landscape that has 
been stained red by the bleeding head. For Kiefer, there is a 
dramatic tension between an absent God after Auschwitz and 
the quest for this God (Stoker 2010a). 
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There are thus two elements that must be taken into 
account in order to establish the religious or spiritual: the form: 
the type of transcendence, the way in which the relation 
between heaven and earth or ‚beyond‛ and ‚here‛ is seen; and 
the content, the further specification of the type by an artist or 
author. The types of transcendence should be viewed as forms 
or open concepts, like Kant’s a priori concepts of understanding 
that still have to receive further specification: ‚Thoughts with-
out content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind‛ 
(Kant 1929: 93, A51/B75). A type or form of transcendence is 
thus like a pattern or template that is filled in by content, by a 
certain type of spirituality.  
As far as this content is concerned, how the other reality is 
evoked within the form of immanent transcendence depends on 
the author or artist. Friedrich finds his sources in his Lutheran 
tradition, whereas Kiefer uses all kinds of religious sources. 
Thus, Friedrich and Kiefer, on the one hand, share the same 
view of the relation between heaven and earth (the type or form 
of transcendence) but, on the other, differ from each other in the 
way in which they interpret this spiritually.  
Radical transcendence can also be offered as an example. 
Radical transcendence can be detected in both Kierkegaard and 
in the Rothko Chapel paintings (Stoker 2008b). While the same 
form of transcendence is being described in both, the difference 
in the content, the specification, is evident, as is the difference 
in medium (Kierkegaard, linguistic; Rothko, art). In Kierke-
gaard, the content is determined by his Lutheran faith and the 
philosophy that he articulated in his polemics against Hegel. In 
Rothko, it is determined by his belief in a universal religious 
experience, unconnected to the world religions.  
Examples of the Four Types as Form and Content 
The four forms of transcendence have been described in a for-
mal way above. As form, transcendence is often present but 
concealed, because it still appears with a certain content. Con-
crete examples of how the four types function on a practical 
level are offered below, with reference to writers such as Tillich, 
Kierkegaard, Altizer, and Derrida. These writers are, of course, 
only examples; other writers or artists stamp the type of trans-
cendence they are defining with their own content. 
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Immanent Transcendence (Paul Tillich) 
a) Form 
Both realities are viewed as closely involved with each other—
the absolute is experienced in and through mundane reality. 
Variants of this type can be found in Schleiermacher, Hegel, 
and Tillich. 
b) Form and Content in Tillich 
As opposed to an isolated transcendence of God as a perfect be-
ing far away and highly exalted in heaven, Tillich attempts to 
examine transcendence and immanence together. The starting 
point is the experience that people have of the Ultimate. Reli-
gious experience is as broad as human experience itself. Tillich 
can say this because he assumes that the human being has an 
immediate awareness of the Ultimate.  
A brief insight into the functioning of immanent trans-
cendence follows. I will first show how, according to Tillich, im-
manent transcendence functions in the experience of everyone 
and then (according to Tillich) what the situation is in organ-
ized religion in this respect. 
c) The General Experience of Immanent Transcendence  
Everyone needs courage to be. He or she needs to survive in the 
face of the constant threat of non-being. Because a finite power 
can have no power over non-being, Tillich assumes that this is 
an experience of infinite power, the power of being, of Being-
itself (Tillich 1980). This power infused people with the courage 
to be and is therefore immanent but at the same time is 
transcendent. Tillich emphasizes the transcendent aspect first: 
As the power of being, God transcends every being and also 
the totality of beings—the world. Being-itself is beyond fin-
itude and infinity, otherwise it would be conditioned by 
something other than itself.... There is no proportion or 
gradation between the finite and the infinite. (Tillich 1953: 
263) 
God is not the supreme being, but Being-itself. Ultimately, 
God is inexpressible; hence, one can only speak symbolically of 
God. That people experience Being-itself in the courage to be 
points to the fact that, however transcendent Being-itself may 
be, it is also immanent. God is a not a stranger to the human 
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being: we participate in the God who transcends us because we 
experience him as a power in our existence. Tillich continues 
thus, ‚On the other hand, everything finite participates in be-
ing-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the 
power of being. It would be swallowed by non-being ...‛ (Tillich 
1953: 263). 
He does not, therefore, emphasize transcendence at the ex-
pense of immanence, given that the finite already participates 
in Being-itself. Nor does he emphasize immanence at the ex-
pense of transcendence, for transcendence goes beyond the fi-
nite being. Therefore, one cannot speak here of a ‚cosmic mon-
ism.‛ God and the world are not finally one, as they are in 
Hegel (Tillich GW 12: 234; 5: 157).  
d) The Biblical Experience of Immanent Transcendence  
Tillich maintained that the coherence of both elements of trans-
cendence and immanence were best illustrated in the biblical 
God, in the incarnation—something that is unique. In the 
Word’s becoming flesh, the universal, ultimate, and the 
concrete personal elements are united. The Word, the Logos, the 
universal principle of God’s self-manifestation in nature and 
history, appears in something concrete, in the person of Jesus 
Christ (Stoker 1985).  
This type of transcendence is open to culture and searches 
for a mediation between religion and culture. Religion is the 
substance of culture, and culture is the form of religion in Til-
lich. For example, he pays separate attention to art outside the 
church. He considers art that reveals a depth dimension of real-
ity to be religious art.  
In the 1920s, Tillich spoke of a theonomic unified culture 
but since then emphasized more the alienation between God 
and human beings. The ascription of meaning became more of a 
quest for meaning. In his Systematic Theology, he searches for 
answers to questions on the affirmation of life, salvation, and 
hope. 
The salvation that has become visible in Christ has had its 
effect on history. The history of salvation is closely connected 
with profane history but, because of evil, alienation, and sin, 
does not converge with it. God enters history in human acts of 
freedom and love and leads it to completion. Unlike Hegel, 
Tillich regards the victory over the ambiguities within history 
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as only temporarily possible. The ambiguities are constantly 
overcome in fragmentary form where the Kingdom of God is 
manifested (Tillich 1964: 387). 
Radical Transcendence (Søren Kierkegaard) 
a) Form 
The absolute is the wholly other and thus may be sharply dis-
tinguished from mundane reality. Variants of this type can be 
found in Kierkegaard, Barth, and Marion. 
b) Form and Content in Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard regards the self of the human being as a synthesis 
in which the oppositions between eternity and temporality, fini-
tude and infinity, necessity and freedom are held together and 
concretized. The human being develops this human structure in 
an ethical or religious way. While human beings determine 
themselves in the ethical sphere, they discover that they do not 
have the truth in themselves in the religious sphere. The rela-
tionship with God is thus entirely different in both spheres of 
life. In the ethical sphere God is equated with the moral order 
(Kierkegaard 1983): there is no qualitative difference here be-
tween God and human beings, as is the case in the religious 
sphere. 
The qualitative difference between God and human beings 
is not intended as an isolated transcendence, as in Kant and 
deism. In Kierkegaard, God is a personal God, who is love. 
With the religious person in general, which Kierkegaard calls 
religion A, there is the distinction between the human as crea-
ture and God as creator, resulting in the human being’s radical 
dependence on God. In the Christian faith—called religion B—
the qualitative difference between God and human beings is 
that the human being is a sinner and God is holy. Below is a 
brief exploration of how radical transcendence informs the rela-
tionship between God and human beings in religion in general 
and in the Christian faith in particular.  
c) Radical Transcendence in Fear and Trembling 
An example of religion A is given in the persona of Abraham in 
Fear and Trembling, published in 1843 (Kierkegaard, 1983). For 
the believer, God’s radical transcendence means that he (the 
believer) lives paradoxically in the tension between the irrecon-
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cilability of the finite and the infinite. The model for this is the 
story of Abraham’s approach to Isaac. Abraham shows how the 
believer functions by isolating himself from others and by his 
obedience to God. Abraham says nothing to Sarah, Eliezer, or 
Isaac about his having been instructed to sacrifice his son and 
goes on his way in loneliness, separated from his own commun-
ity. 
This story shows that faith has two movements. The first 
involves distancing oneself from finitude (Abraham’s willing-
ness to sacrifice the son he loves). That is infinite resignation, 
the suffering of the believer in the tension between the finite 
and the infinite. That tension emerges precisely from the fact 
that the finite continues to remain very important for the be-
liever and is not discarded in favour of infinity. ‚Yet Abraham 
had faith, and had faith for this life‛ (Kierkegaard 1983: 20). The 
second movement is believing by reason of the absurd, the be-
lief that Abraham would get his son Isaac back. Faith is faith in 
the impossible, faith that for God everything is possible. Abra-
ham shows that the individual is related absolutely to the abso-
lute. The individual's duty to God suspends the ethical duty (to 
man in general). The individual is higher than the general.  
These two movements hold true not only for the faith of 
Abraham but also for that of every believer. The movement of 
breaking with finite existence while the finite cannot be given 
up and that of opening oneself up for grace (Kierkegaard 1983: 
38). Religion is incommensurable with mundane existence, 
something that is particularly evident in the Christian faith. 
d) Radical Transcendence in the Christian Faith 
Christians are pilgrims, strangers in the world. The transcend-
ent God challenges human existence by calling the human be-
ing from a safe present into an uncertain future. According to 
the Christian faith, eternal truth comes into time (Kierkegaard 
1992: 209). The incarnation is an indication of radical transcend-
ence and cannot be made comprehensible. It is the absolute par-
adox. That is why Kierkegaard, writing both under his own 
name and under his pseudonyms, makes use of ‚indirect com-
munication.‛ He communicates indirectly when it is a matter of 
a communication regarding existence. Unique to Christian-
religious communication is that, because of its revelatory 
character, it primarily involves a direct (doctrinal) communica-
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tion, such as the communication that the human being is sinful. 
When this revelatory fact is known, direct communication 
changes into indirect communication (Kierkegaard 1967-1978: 1, 
288-89). 
In the Christian faith the human being as sinner stands in 
contrast to God (Kierkegaard 1992: 583-84), which constitutes 
the qualitative distinction between God and human beings. As 
Climacus writes in Philosophical Fragments: 
But then my soul is also gripped with new amazement—
indeed it is filled with adoration, for it certainly would have 
been odd if it had been a human poem. Presumably it could 
occur to a human being to poetize himself in the likeness of 
the god or the god in the likeness of himself, but not to 
poetize that the god poetized himself in the likeness of a 
human being. (Kierkegaard 1985: 36) 
Here also the two movements of faith can be detected. With 
faith, one grounds oneself in God and must break with one’s 
immediate existence (the first movement of faith). Man is a 
sinner and should become a different person: ‚a person of a dif-
ferent quality … a new person‛ (Kierkegaard 1985: 18). A trans-
formation is necessary. In an attitude of humility, he opens 
himself up to the grace of forgiveness. This is the second move-
ment of faith. 
This type of radical transformation sees religion A and pri-
marily the Christian faith (religion B) as incommensurable with 
culture. Sacred history is qualitatively different from profane 
history. Kierkegaard does not deny that there many forms of re-
ligion (in the ethical and religious spheres) but acknowledges 
the clear boundary indicating the qualitative difference be-
tween God and human beings. The believer should try to en-
dure the tension of the irreconcilability of the finite and infinite 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 484). That the finite is not denied is apparent 
from the place that art occupies in the Christian faith. If Tillich 
sought for the religious in art outside the church as a revelation 
of God as well, it is different with Kierkegaard. Art is important 
for him as well but should, from a Christian point of view, only 
have the function of promoting faith. Art outside the church is 
merely a mirror of the aesthetic and ethical spheres (Stoker 
2010b). 
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Radical Immanence (Thomas Altizer)  
a) Form 
The absolute is no longer sought outside mundane reality; both 
realities converge. This type can be found in, among others, Al-
tizer, Taylor (during a specific phase), and Vattimo. 
b) Form and Content in Altizer 
With Nietzsche, Altizer holds that the Christian transcendent 
God, who is opposed to life, is dead. Altizer criticizes the extra-
worldly God of deism who, in his view, is the same as the God 
of Barth (Altizer 1966: 91). 
It is God himself who is the transcendent enemy of the 
fullness and the passion of man’s life in the world, and 
only through God’s death can humanity be liberated 
from that repression, which is the real ruler of history. 
(Altizer 1966: 22) 
Altizer continued to speak about God after the death of the 
transcendent God. As a Hegelian theologian, Altizer views God 
as a dialectical process that ends in the merging of God, world 
and the human self. Kenosis, incarnation, the new humanity, 
and the Kingdom of God are developments in this process. 
c) Kenosis and Incarnation  
Using Hegel as a reference, Altizer sketches the dialectical de-
velopment of the God or the Spirit. When the Spirit exists in its 
kenotic form, he can no longer be seen as he originally was but 
only as the opposite of himself or as the Being-other of the 
Spirit. The Spirit is the emptying process of negativity and thus 
constitutes the actual reality of the world. Altizer sees God or 
the Spirit as a dialectical process reflected in the kenotic reality 
of the Word become flesh. In no case does he want to speak of 
God’s existence. God has denied and transcended himself in the 
incarnation and has thus completely and definitively ceased to 
exist in his original form. God no longer exists as a transcendent 
spirit or sovereign lord (Altizer 1966: 62-69).  
This is a radical Christology. The death of the Father is the 
birth of the Son. God is Jesus, by which Altizer means that the 
incarnation is a total act through which God denied himself and 
ceased to exist as the transcendent God. 
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The truth that is revealed in Christ is universal, instead of 
particular. The incarnation includes not only the individual his-
torical figure Jesus but is also an all-encompassing kenotic pro-
cess via which the infinite empties itself into the finite. The in-
carnation and the cross are thus not seen as individual events 
but as an eschatological process of redemption that goes on, a 
process that consists in a progressive transfer of the Spirit into 
the flesh, the transfer from transcendence to immanence. 
d) God, History, and Universal Humanity  
Thus, the death of God is not a denial of the divine. The disap-
pearance of the transcendent God entails the appearance of the 
completely immanent divine in history. This means that the op-
position between God and the world has disappeared. History 
is thus the incarnation of God.  
Altizer confirms that he is not a difference thinker in the 
sense of Kierkegaard but, like Hegel, views difference as merely 
relative and dialectical. He writes:  
But *God’s+ death is a self-negation or self-annihilation: 
consequently, by freely willing the dissolution of His 
transcendent ‚Selfhood‛, the Godhead reverses the life and 
movement of the transcendent realm, transforming trans-
cendence into immanence, thereby abolishing of every alien 
other. (Altizer 1966: 113; italics mine). 
As the quotation above indicates, the core of the content Altizer 
gives to this type of transcendence, radical immanence, is the 
destruction of every ‚alien other.‛ The difference or ‚alien oth-
er‛ is to be viewed as merely relative and dialectical, and ultim-
ately leads to the same outcome. Altizer does not recognize the 
non-dialectical difference, the wholly other encountered in 
Kierkegaard and which emerges again in Derrida as transcend-
ence as alterity. Altizer rejects all forms of transcendence inso-
far as they point to something outside this world, to some alien 
other. He writes: 
With the death of God, a primordial Being existing in-itself 
as its own creation or ground has been shattered, and with 
its dissolution every alien other loses its intrinsic ground. 
Now a new humanity arises that can give itself to the 
immediate actuality of the present …. (Altizer 1966: 72) 
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The English poet William Blake called this new humanity 
the body of Jesus because it is the incarnated body of that God 
who died eternally for human beings. Altizer thus observed 
that Jesus is the Christian name for the totality of experience 
and the new reality created through the destruction of the 
original being whose death ushers in a new humanity, freed 
from all transcendent norms and meaning (Altizer 1966: 73). 
Altizer defends a form of pantheism, the view that God is all 
and all is God. His view of God as a dialectical process admits a 
minimal presence of transcendence. 
e) Kingdom of God  
‚Extraworldly‛ transcendence has been rejected, which means 
an end to the ‚no‛ to this world. God is Jesus and humanity is 
the body of Jesus. Thus, there is reconciliation and a ‚yes‛ to 
life and mundane reality. Altizer sees reconciliation as a nega-
tive process through which each alien other is turned around, a 
process through which all negations are denied (Altizer 1966: 
114). Through this kenotic process, every power that limits life 
is destroyed. The dialectical divine process finds its eschatology 
in the Kingdom of God that is completely present now. 
For the content of this, Altizer refers to Nietzsche’s doc-
trine of eternal return as a saying ‚yes‛ to this world (Altizer 
1977). This eternal return should not be viewed as a return to an 
‚eternity‛ at the beginning of time, as in the archaic myths. 
Eternity exists in the present: the Kingdom of God is completely 
present (Altizer 1980: 46). Altizer continues to use the biblical 
term ‚Kingdom of God‛ to refer to the presence of God as im-
manent universal Spirit. It has to do with the presence of God 
‚only through the absence of the God of pure transcendence‛ 
(Altizer 1980: 50). 
Each type of transcendence has—when it is given content 
—its own language for articulating that transcendence. Tillich 
found that in the symbol: one can speak of God only symbol-
ically. Kierkegaard pointed to the language of direct-indirect 
communication. Altizer chose the language of the parable, the 
language Jesus used. In this language, that which is said is 
immediately present—the parable says what it says directly, as 
distinct from metaphor and allegory (Altizer 1980: 8). That is 
why the language of the parable is used to speak about the 
present Kingdom of God: ‚... parable sounds or speaks an im-
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mediate presence. True, that presence is the presence of world, 
and the presence of that world which is immediately and com-
monly at hand‛ (Altizer 1980: 6).  
This type of radical immanence removes the opposition be-
tween sacred and profane. Indeed, it illustrates the way in 
which God is a dialectical process that ends in the Kingdom of 
God as the total presence. As a result, eternity exists in the now 
of the affirmation of life. The sacred changes into the profane 
(Altizer 1966: 51). Altizer sees a parallel here between religion 
and art in that neither the contemporary world nor modern art 
refers to transendence (Altizer 1980). Just as the sacred becomes 
the profane, so art becomes non-art and vice versa, which leads 
to an aesthetization of the world. 
Transcendence as Alterity (Jacques Derrida)  
a) Form 
The relationship between transcendence and immanence is no 
longer viewed as an opposition. Rather, one has learned to 
think beyond the opposition, whereby the wholly other can ap-
pear in every other. This type of transcendence can be found in 
Levinas, Derrida, Irigaray, De Dijn, and Taylor (during a partic-
ular phase). 
b) Form and Content in Derrida 
As a difference thinker, difference is central to Derrida, but un-
like Kierkegaard, in Derrida's case, it has to do with the ques-
tion of language and meaning (Derrida 1997). He views lang-
uage broadly, not as consisting only of words, sentences and 
texts; rather, he views the whole of reality textually.  
Within linguistics, De Saussure argued that the connection 
between signifiant (signifier) and signifié (signified) was arbi-
trary. Signifier and signified do not have any content in them-
selves but come into being within a series of mutual distinctions 
and differences. Derrida radicalizes De Saussure’s notion of dif-
ference into différance and speaks of an ongoing and groundless 
‚trace.‛ Here he has in mind the becoming character of signs 
and texts that, like footprints in the sand, shows the becoming 
of the constant movement. The trace does not refer back to an 
authentic beginning, to a ‚true meaning,‛ a search for a first ori-
gin, as had been done in metaphysical theology, ontotheology.  
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c) The Death of the God of Ontotheology and the Postponement 
of Definitive Meaning 
In Derrida, the death of God has a somewhat different meaning 
from the way the phrase is used in Altizer and Hegel. The God 
of ontotheology, God as origin, as true ‚Meaning,‛ is dead. Der-
rida deconstructs the metaphysical ideal of the permanent pres-
ence of a fixed order of things to which the signs of language al-
legedly refer. Beings can only exist in a context with other be-
ings. This includes the signifier and the signified function with-
in a field of traces and references, as well as the entities them-
selves as signs within contexts with their references. Derrida 
views reality textually. There are no linguistic signs that take up 
a transcendent or transcendental position with respect to a con-
text; none that arrange relationships of meaning. If there were, 
meaning would have the status of evident presence, of a being 
or an inner light. Instead of viewing concepts as ‚transcend-
entally signified,‛ Derrida views the linguistic sign as a trace 
that does not stand alone but refers to something and leads to 
something. A linguistic sign exists in an infinitely widening net-
work of internal references. For this, Derrida uses the term dif-
férance, in addition to the term trace. Literally, this term means 
both ‚to differ‛ and ‚to postpone.‛ The movement of différance 
is the movement of difference and postponement. Différance 
means that incomprehensible differences are active in every ex-
perience and articulation of meaning, which entails the post-
ponement of definitive meaning (Derrida 1982).  
d) Deconstruction of the Opposition between Transcendence 
and Immanence 
Derrida’s philosophy deconstructs, dissects, hierarchical oppo-
sitions that are said to represent an order in reality. This is not 
only a dismantling. Deconstruction also has a positive effect. 
The undermining of fixed patterns brings about an openness for 
new meanings. In that sense, Derrida is justified in calling de-
construction an ‚invention de l'autre,‛ allowing an irreducible 
singular entity to arise (Evink 2002: 77, 88). The deconstruction 
of the opposition between transcendence and immanence 
serves as an example here. 
Derrida has a great deal of sympathy for difference in Kier-
kegaard, as can be seen from his reading of Kierkegaard's Fear 
and Trembling below, but Derrida works it out differently. If one 
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examines the positions of radical transcendence (Kierkegaard) 
and radical immanence (Altizer) discussed above from the 
perspective of Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction, then the 
one pole continually exists in a hierarchical relation to the other. 
Radical transcendence does not do justice to immanence, and, 
conversely, radical immanence does not do justice to transcend-
ence. Deconstruction dismantles such hierarchical positions. 
Derrida rejects Kierkegaard's God: 
[W]e should stop thinking about God as someone, over 
there, way up there, transcendent, and, what is more—into 
the bargain, precisely—capable, more than any satellite 
orbiting in space, of seeing into the most secret of the most 
interior places. (Derrida 1992: 108) 
The reference to God who sees ‚into the most secret of the most 
interior places‛ is a reference to Matthew 6:4. 
Deconstruction does not simply involve a reversal: if it did, 
the hierarchical order would remain in place and only an ex-
change of roles would occur. Radical immanence (Altizer) 
would take the place of radical transcendence, with the sup-
pression of the wholly other as a result. Moreover, Altizer's 
making presence central shows unmistakable signs of the onto-
theology that Derrida had criticized. Derrida searches for the 
intangible wholly other. That happens in what I, as distinct 
from the preceding positions, call ‚transcendence as alterity.‛ 
Derrida interprets this position by viewing the biblical God, 
who sees what is secret (Matthew 6:4), as absolute alterity, as al-
terity in myself, an alterity that is more internal to me than I 
myself. ‚God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a 
secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior‛ 
(Derrida 1992: 108). My existence is determined by an appeal 
that makes itself known in the conscience.  
I will explore transcendence as alterity more deeply and 
describe it via Donner la Mort supplemented by Derrida’s ex-
planation of negative theology. 
Transcendence as Alterity in Donner la Mort (The Gift of Death) 
In Donner la mort, Derrida gives his deconstructive reading of 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. He deconstructs the theistic 
concept of God as 
19                                         CULTURE AND TRANSCENDENCE 
X who on the one hand would already exist, and who, on 
the other hand, what is more, would be endowed with 
attributes such as paternity and the power to penetrate 
secrets, to see the invisible, to see in me better than I .... 
(Derrida 1992: 108) 
As can be seen below, Derrida intends the wholly other to 
encompass a much broader meaning than simply indicating the  
biblical God. 
Derrida acknowledges the relationship with an absolute al-
terity from which a call goes out but generalizes it and connects 
it not with religious faith, as Kierkegaard does, but with ethics. 
He generalizes the absolute responsibility to God as a matter of 
absolute responsibility that everyone has. This shift from faith 
to ethics arises because he generalizes the wholly other. 
Transcendence concerns not only God as the wholly other but 
every other is wholly other.  
If God is completely other, the figure or name of the wholly 
other, then every other (one) is every (bit) other. Tout autre 
est tout autre. This formula disturbs Kierkegaard’s discourse 
on one level while at the same time reinforcing its most 
extreme ramifications. It implies that God, as the wholly 
other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the 
wholly other. And since each of us, everyone else, each oth-
er is infinitely other in its absolute singularity, inaccessible, 
solitary, transcendent ... then what can be said about 
Abraham’s relation to God can be said about my relation 
without relation to every other (one) as every (bit) other [tout 
autre comme tout autre], in particular my relation to my 
neighbor or my loved ones who are as inaccessible to me, as 
secret and transcendent as Jahweh. Every other (in the sense 
of each other) is every bit other (absolutely other). (Derrida 
1992: 78) 
As completely transcendent and completely other God is 
like all others. The infinite alterity of the wholly other belongs 
to every other, to every man and every woman, even to every 
living being (Derrida 1992: 83f., 87). That is transcendence as al-
terity, a transcendence beyond the opposition of transcendence 
and immanence. God is everywhere that the wholly other is. So, 
in Derrida’s reading, the story of Abraham’s sacrifice shows the 
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structure of everyday: ‚Through its paradox it speaks of the 
responsibility required at every moment for every man and 
every woman‛ (Derrida 1992: 78). From the moment that I am 
connected to the call of the other, I know, just like Abraham 
answering God, that I can answer that only ‚by sacrificing 
ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also re-
spond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all others‛ (Der-
rida 1992: 68). By choosing one obligation, I betray all my other 
obligations to those I know or do not know, all who could die 
of hunger or disease (Derrida 1992: 69, 70f.). 
e) General Apophatics: Messianic Structure and Khora 
This type of transcendence is found on the margins of or out-
side organized religions such as Judaism and Christianity. In 
Derrida, this type has more to do with indicating a structure of 
alterity rather than a concrete revelation or religion; more about 
openness (Offenbarkeit) than about something revealed. That be-
comes evident through Derrida’s turning Christian apophatics, 
negative theology, into a general apophatics (Caputo 1997: 41-
57).  
Derrida’s philosophy is undeniably related to negative the-
ology. Negative theology uses apophatic language, in which 
positive statements about God are negated in a search for that 
wholly other that cannot be properly articulated in language. 
Deconstruction and différance are not this and not that, not this 
way and not that way. Truth and justice, to which Derrida’s 
thinking is directed, seem unattainable because of their continu-
ing postponement. The negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite, Eckhart, and Angelus Silesius emphasizes 
God’s complete alterity. As previously mentioned, Derrida 
himself rejects, as we said, the radically transcendent God and 
is therefore not that interested in negative theology because of 
its orientation to God as supreme being. What interests him is 
its use of language (Derrida 1998: 59). It is a language that at-
tempts to transcend itself, but, despite that, remains a language, 
one that tests its own limits. It is a language that attempts to 
erase itself and to discard its contents and is related to a trans-
cendent ‚place,‛ a mystery outside of or above language. The 
name of God can only be preserved on condition that this name 
also constantly erases itself: ‚‘God’ ‘is’ the name of this bot-
21                                         CULTURE AND TRANSCENDENCE 
tomless collapse, of this endless desertification of language" 
(Derrida 1998: 59). 
A similar shift is evident in Derrida’s reading of Christian 
negative theology to that in his reading of Fear and Trembling. 
As the faith story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac is formalized 
into an everyday event, so the apophatic movement, the nega-
tion with reference to what is transcendent, as well as the nega-
tion and affirmation of the God of Christian theology, is formal-
ized and abstracted into a general apophatics. The shift from 
Christian apophatics to a general apophatics may be illustrated 
by the following quotation:  
Indeed, negative theology is one of the most remarkable 
manifestations of this differing-from-itself. We thus say: in 
that of which people could believe that it is the core of a 
history of Christianity … the apophatic project is also de-
voted to making itself independent of revelation, of every literal 
speaking about the New Testament eventuality, of the 
coming of Christ, of the Passion, of the doctrine of the Trin-
ity, etc. An immediate mysticism, but then without a vision, 
a kind of abstract kenosis, liberates it from every authority, 
every story, every dogma, every belief and ultimately every 
belief that can be defined. (Derrida 1998: 73f.; italics mine) 
Derrida is thus searching for an ‚an-archic origin‛ (Derrida 
2002: 54-59). To that end, he abstracts from the revelations of 
world religions and conceives of the condition of the possibility 
of revelation as a structure of openness (Offenbarkeit). In Hei-
degger’s terms, the revelation of transcendence is, like a specific 
event, something that can occur only within the events of being 
that first make it possible. A revelation presupposes the open-
ing up of being.  
Derrida describes this ‚general structure of openness‛ in a 
Jewish way and a Greek way. The Jewish way is the messianic 
structure as the formal structure of openness to an alterity in 
time that entails both a promise and a command: the promise of 
a just future and the command to be open to this and to be re-
ceptive to the wholly other. The Greek way is khora, which is 
the reception room that precedes space and time, it does not 
start any time or history and is the always presupposed condi-
tion necessary for revelation. 
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This type of transcendence is given its own language in 
Derrida as well, that of the deconstruction of the apophatic 
language of negative theology. With regard to the attitude to 
culture, this position shows a similarity to that of radical trans-
cendence. It is critical—phenomena in culture should be decon-
structed. This type is beyond the opposition of transcendence 
and immanence in the sense that the wholly other can be in-
dicated via the process of deconstruction in morality, politics, 
religion, and literature. 
In short, transcendence as absolute alterity does not have 
to do with a transcendent God, but with a ‚God‛ who is every-
where that the wholly other is, especially in the ethical (and po-
litical) situation. This position appears to be a via media between 
radical transcendence (Kierkegaard), which emphasizes the 
wholly other in mundane reality too little, and radical imman-
ence (Altizer) which accepts the world as it is through denying 
the wholly other. Derrida searches on the margins of or outside 
the religions for transcendence as alterity, which gives rise to 
such terms as messianism without a messiah and religion with-
out religion. 
Four examples have been given here that show how a 
specific philosopher, theologian, writer, or artist gives content 
to a type or form of transcendence. The essays in part two of 
this volume offer examples of transcendence (two in each case) 
that correspond to one of the four types of transcendence in my 
typology.  
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